Coercive Capital: American Arab Foreign Policy to Coerce Saudi Inflows
The current events surrounding Epstein prove precisely so fraught because they could very well undermine Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s authority.
Mohammad bin Salman did not simply “appear” in charge of Saudi Arabia: a deep opposition sought to seat their own candidate.
Saudi Arabia - Petrodollar King
Whenever you see the United States engage in Islamic affairs, kindly note that the entire policy revolves around the internal politics of Saudi Arabia.
Entire books and even careers revolve around the “petrodollar recycling” of Saudi Arabia and the United States.
1974 JECOR [U.S.-Saudi Arabian] Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation Agreement
Invoked during after resolving the oil embargo of the early 1970’s, the 1974 JECOR agreement resembled a complete equivalent of the recent GENIUS Act, but instead of crypto, it was oil: Saudi oil surpluses from oil sales were to be re-invested into US Treasuries, and Saudi Arabia’s petrochemical industry would patronize American oil, chemical, and engineering businesses.
JECOR’s mission was twofold: first, to teach the Saudis — who had no tradition of organized public agencies — how to operate the fundamental bureaucracy of a modern state; and second, to ensure that all the contracts awarded in pursuit of that mission went to American companies. JECOR would operate for 25 years, channeling billions of Saudi oil dollars back to the United States, but would attract almost no attention in this country because Congress ignored it. The Saudis were paying for it, so there was no need for US appropriations or congressional oversight. https://www.mei.edu/publications/cooperation-under-radar-us-saudi-arabian-joint-commission-economic-cooperation-jecor
By the end of the Clinton administration, JECOR quietly retired, without announcement from either the Saudi’s or Americans: the Saudis would no longer have formal American intervention in domestic administration.
Why Did the US Bother With the “War on Terror” & Iraq War?
King Fahd had a stroke in the 1995 - by the early 2000’s, ambitious successors to the throne awaited his imminent death (2005).
If one recalls, the ENTIRE Anglo-American establishment - both across the US and the UK, endorsed the second Iraq war. Notably absent were the Europeans, who did not share the same petrodollar imperative.
Wahhabism and Overthrowing the Saudi Regime
All “terrorism” against America revolved around one objective: seizing Saudi wealth under a ruler adverse or just neutral to American economic needs.
1979 - Grand Mosque Seizure
To give an idea of how real such a coup proves in Saudi history, al-Otaybi seized the Grand Mosque with the help of the Ikhwan, so-called after the very militia that helped the al-Saud family seize and consolidate power over what one calls today, "Saudia Arabia".
Grand Mosque - Aftermath
In the aftermath of the Grand Mosque siege, Saudi Arabia had to make significant concessions to the Wahabi faction, regressing on pro-Western alignment and social liberalization.
The Grand Mosque siege proved that targeted, calculated violence could deeply influence Saudi Arabian domestic policy.
Saddam Hussein: Puppet to Help Overthrow Saudi Government
Saddam Hussein’s agenda before the second Iraq war revolved around upsetting stability in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt on behalf of some international faction (ostensibly for Iraq). One may find intricate details from Iraqi primary sources, in the link, below:
Oil-for-Food - Iraqi Oil & American Middle-men
With full American connivance, Saddam sold his oil, albeit at reduced and sub-market rates, through the so-called "Oil-for-food" program. While the butt of many jokes, the program did have the desired effect of forcing Saddam to network and broker through American proxies which, not only compelled Saddam to accept a lower oil sale price, but also enriched intermediaries in the Middle East who were allowed to smuggle Iraqi oil with the State Department's blessing, as long as the surpluses went to the "right" people for the right reasons.
For details on how the "Oil-for-Food" program acted as a foil to enrich pro-American allies in the Middle East and assert American control of Iraq's oil marketing, see this link:
Who Was Saddam’s Puppetmaster?
Why could Saddam not concede peace with America? Aside from personal mania, who persuaded him to not abandon his hostility to the United States?
Saddam held secrets - for someone:
The reason why this has all become so controversial is because neither anyone on the 38th floor of the United Nations, nor any diplomat from Russia, or France, or anyone else, can convince Saddam Hussein to disclose what he has and prove those disclosures in a way that you wouldn't need to be aggressively seeking information about the special security apparatus that controls weapons of mass destruction.
Surely, life for Saddam would have been more luxurious and pleasurable, without having provoke the global superpower by menacing an overthrow of one of its key financing partners, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Abu Nidal's Execution by Saddam in 2002
Abu Nidal, the infamous leader of the pro-Palestinian terrorist group ANO(Abu-Nidal Organization), executed the canonical 1980's terrorists attacks against the airlines, such as hijackings and bombings of planes heading to Israel. In addition, Abu Nidal's network directly attacked Israeli government officials, such as the 1982 assassination attempt on Shlomo Argov, Israeli ambassador to the UK.
Abu Nidal even attempted to assassinate Queen Elizabeth, during her 1984 tour of Jordan.
With such potency, Abu Nidal must have threatened to up-end Saddam's foreign relationships on the eve of the Second Iraq War (with Qaddafi, most likely, as Qaddafi had history with Abu Nidal), and consequently faced elimination by Saddam's interior security.
Why WMD's in Media?
The WMD "standard", required by the Bush administration, meant to establish a guarantee that Iraq would do everything in its power to forestall her terrorist clients from using WMD's. The public was sold some lies about nukes in Iraq, but it was really about Saddam's willingness to guarantee that groups under his umbrella would not acquire these weapons, or if they did, he would provide full and total support to the Anglo-American security organs in eliminating any groups and their WMD's in his orbit.
Gaddafi - the Great Saudi Spoiler
The only vocal, credible opponent to the Saudi-American status quo proved Qaddafi.
Routinely, he spurned Saudi initiatives resolving broader peace prospects.
Despite his opposition to Saudi Arabia's appeasement to the West, Qaddafi remained firmly "on-sides" during the "War on Terror". Unfortunately for him, he, too, would also later overestimate his usefulness...
Who in the West Wanted Saudi Regime Change?
Despite Qaddafi's patronage of a diminished and isolated 2002 Saddam client, it became common knowledge that even during the Iraq War, Qaddafi collaborated extensively with the Anglo-American establishment on counter-terrorism:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14774533
Libya and Iraq - Casualties in the "Deep State" War over Saudi Arabia's Future
It's not clear who or what compelled Saddam to embrace his anti-American stance on American proxies and financing sources within the Middle East, but it seems very, very unlikely that Saddam acted solely on his own initiative: Saddam proved, repeatedly, his willingness to "play his part" in a grander scheme (e.g. Iran-Iraq war), if he felt it aggrandized his regime.
Back to Saudi Arabia and Trump
Trump's main foreign policy agenda requires him to patch-up dollar inflows by any means - if it means using Israel act as the "bad cop" to secure Mohammad bin Salman's legacy, then let it be.
Failure of Trump to secure foreign policy victories undermines stability of Mohammad bin Salman and his purchases of US assets, especially Treasury bonds. America lacks the prestige and financial headroom to "impose" a tyrant on Saudi Arabia, and so Trump must use Israel, Jordan, and Egypt as levers to coerce a desirable outcome within the Middle East to cement another generation of Saudi capital inflows into the United States.
Risk - Israeli Coup
Netanyahu's policies remain deeply unpopular in Israel - to the extent that Netanyahu now has the same problem as Mohammad bin Salman: he must resort to influencing Israeli domestic policy through foreign policy, as recently seen in Syria with the Druze.
The Druze & the Netanyahu-Trump Fait Accompli
The main risk to the entire Trump strategy with Saudi Arabia comes from a collapse of the Netanyahu government - thus, it proves imperative to create new alliances, regionally, to coerce the Israeli security establishment, much of which resents Netanyahu, to accept the Netanyahu-Trump vector as permanent.
Thus, we saw the recent partitioning of Southern Syria, into a separate Druze region, as part of the negotiation to present the Netanyahu-Trump vision as a "fait accompli" - at this point, Netanyahu could be tried for treason, tomorrow, and nothing substantial would change in Israel's foreign policy alignment.
